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A race from the bottom? Lessons from a workers’ 
struggle at a Bangalore warehouse  
This paper analyses the emergence of the ‘full package’ firm in India and its 
implications for workers’ strategies. A ‘full package’ firm expands outward, 
from low-value assembly-only products to high-value specialized garment 
production; consolidating under one roof. Historically, geographic and 
political barriers separated centres of value-creation (producers) and value- 
capture (brands and retailers) in the global garment sector. However, 
enhanced value-capture at the point of production has led to considerable 
consolidation organizationally, giving an increasingly symbiotic character to 
relationships within ‘buyer driven’ supply chains. Though this change 
aggregates the bargaining power of workers, it also introduces new 
obstacles to workers’ organization. The concomitant rise of supplier-end 
value capture allows garment trade unions to nonetheless demand greater 
shares. Thus, previously unviable modes and methods have become 
available to workers engaged in struggles with their employers in the 
globalized garment sector. This paper examines a protracted workers’ 
struggle in light of this process. In doing so, the paper demonstrates that 
codes of conduct and auditing alone cannot significantly impact labour 
standards because the needs of capital accumulation are greater than the 
threat posed by any auditing program or code. Ultimately, the paper 
demonstrates that labour rights within the garment GVC will not arrive 
through a rights-based approach – though strong codes of conduct and 
independent auditing can assist – but rather through a combination of an 
increased power of suppliers vis-a`-vis buyers, greater workers’ bargaining 
power with their direct employers, and – critically – workers’ self 
organization.  
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Manufacturing sectors with high variable capital – toys, garments, footwear, etc. 
– relocated production from the Global North to the Global South early in the 
process of globalization.
1 This globalized ‘race to the bottom’ intensified the 
asymmetry between producers and buyers (Armbruster-Sandoval, 2005; Hale 
and Wills, 2011; Kreider, 2002). The functionally and geographically disintegrated 
garment industry is one of the most exploitative, labour-intensive, and 
‘globalisable’ sectors in the world economy and indeed has become an archetype 
of this global ‘race’ (Hale and Wills, 2011). Fluctuations in purchasing patterns, 
seasonality, and fickle ‘fast-fashion’ trends, require high volume production and 
quick turnarounds to accommodate just-in-time orders (Brooks, 2007). 
Accordingly, for the past century, garment production has been the phase of the 
clothing commodity chain that brands and retailers have sought most to 
outsource, using high-rates of fluidity to reduce liabilities of investment (Collins, 
2009). By limiting investment to bulk purchasing contracts, brand companies 
have been able to maximize profits by throwing factory owners, who have thinner 
profit margins, into bidding wars. The pressure of competition is then transferred 
onto workers, who must work longer for less in conditions that are progressively 
worse. Factory floor workers are soon left without the wiggle room in negotiations 
with their direct employers, virtually powerless to form trade unions, obtain livable 
wages, or improve workplace conditions (Collins, 2009; Hale and Wills, 2011). 
These structural limitations to labour agency and organization in the garment 
sector have inspired alternative attempts to establish workers’ rights such as 
through the WTO and bilateral trade agreements, corporate codes of conduct, 
and auditing – which have either fallen far below a basic threshold of success or 
failed outright (Brooks, 2007; Kumar, 2015; Seidman, 2009).  
Human rights issues have historically been effective on issues that can be 
addressed ‘from above’ (political prisoners, slavery, child labour) – in which the 
cost of addressing the issue is less than the cost of reputational damage. Labour 
rights – specifically demands around wages and benefits – have been far more 
efficacious when demanded from the shopfloor. Indeed, the most successful and 
sustainable means of implementing labour rights has been through workers’ self-
organization and self-activity – frequently through trade unions.  
In this paper, I argue that the 2005 phase-out of the 30-year Multi-Fiber 
Agreement, ending global quota limits, which triggered radical changes in the 
economic geography of the global garment sector. These changes, driven by the 
logic of competition, opened up new vistas for garment workers in labour-rich 
countries such as India. In the campaign documented in this paper, we see that 
codes of conduct, auditing regimes, and consumer activists – established and 
driven by a rights-based framework and a sense of international solidarity 
respectively – played an important role in supporting a workers’ campaign. 
However, as we see from the case, these secondary tactics are only as strong as 
the weakness of capital and/or the structural power of workers.  
This paper takes a firm-level case study approach to explore the factors in India 
that led to the consolidation and diversification of garment production, in this 
case denim, and the consequent transformation of relations between buyers and 
sellers, workers and bosses. I suggest that the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement 
brought with it an end to the regime of ‘comprador capital’ that had dominated 
Indian economic life from the early post-colonial days allowing indigenous firms 
to piggyback onto foreign corporations seeking access to cheap labour and raw 
materials. The post-Multi-Fiber Agreement era has seen globalized competition 
weaken and gradually removed altogether the autonomy of smaller firms across 
the globe leaving many absorbed into larger rivals, forced to merge, or simply 
vanished into the red. Increasingly what remains, in a handful of countries, are a 
growing number of mega suppliers; powerful enough to corner the supply chains 
of specialized products, and intensify supplier-end value-capture. Meanwhile, 
large retailer/brand oligopolies simultaneously benefit from growing profits 
brought on by economies of scale and integration, while becoming gradually 
dependent on increasingly oligopolistic suppliers. Thus, the ‘buyer-driven’ 
character of the commodity chain gives way to a kind of ‘buyer– producer 
symbiosis’. In consequence, labour’s resistance adapts as well.  
As the case study demonstrates, the development of economies of consistent 
size and scale increases capitalist accumulation at the supplier-end, allowing for 
the introduction of new technologies that cause a ‘cascading effect’ (Nolan et al., 
2008) down the supply chain, expanding each link. I argue that the symbiosis 
that emerges between global buyers and producers leads to a closer integration 
of supplier-end capital; horizontally, as factories grow larger; and vertically, from 
factory to warehousing and logistics to retail.
2 The increased value capture at the 
bottom of the global supply chain, closes the historical and geographical gap 
between spaces of value capture and value creation.
3 I maintain that the 
reverberations of this change, through production and the circulation of capital, 
results in a corresponding adaptation of workers’ resistance in the garment 
sector that reflects the shift in the locus of power from spaces of consumption to 
production. The case of Arvind highlighted in this paper embodies this symbiosis 
and the changing relationship of buyer and producer, from asymmetrical 
monopsony to a kind of synergetic interdependence.  
Domestic suppliers operate as giant contractors in the Global South have taken 
on functions attributed to lead firms in the coordination of value chains of their 
own. This has contributed to their ability to reorganize production in order to 
undermine workers’ actions at a single factory, while also diminishing the 
leverage of brands, who are made more deeply rooted and less able to ‘cut-and-
run’ from their suppliers. Indeed what may have initially been an attempt by 
global brands/retailers to facilitate the consolidation of the value chain has taken 
a life of its own. As entire commodity chains are digested by single entities, the 
workers therein find themselves capable of larger scale operations, too; with the 
potential for multi-phasic organization allowing them to bring a full-court press 
against their newly amalgamated employers, and avoid the pitfalls of single 
factory resistance (such as isolated contingents of victorious workers becoming 
casualties of the market). In the absence of effective voluntary, corporate, statist, 
or multi-stakeholder initiatives, it was the underlying logics of competition coupled 
with the subjective agency of workers that have opened up new vistas for 
workers’ bargaining power. Thus, the evolution of managerial forms in the 
apparel industry, as in other sectors, engenders a reciprocal evolution in labour 
strategies, and within the case of this paper indicated a distinct departure from 
traditional ‘anti-sweatshop’ campaigns, which historically targeted the buyers 
rather than the producers in the sector.  
The case method  
India is a middle-income democracy with a vibrant domestic market. However, 
globally fluid borders weaken the variations between states, which is particularly 
acute in labour-intensive sectors (Yueng, 2014). Through an analysis of a 
specific 2011–2015 workers’ struggle at a distribution site outside Bangalore for 
jeans manufacturer Arvind Group (herein after ‘Arvind’), I illustrate the effects of 
greater supplier-end value capture on the organization of both domestic capital 
and labour, as each seeks to enlarge its share of the surplus. Additionally, the 
paper contributes to ongoing debates on the relationship between economic 
upgrading and social upgrading that stem from ILOs Decent Work Agenda. The 
research herein supports Selwyn’s (2013) claims that rather than being a ‘top 
down’ process, social upgrading grows out of the class antagonism between 
capital and labour ‘from below’ (or ‘labour-led’) resulting in concessions from 
state and/or capital but, as is shown with Arvind, these newly value-laden firms 
have a greater ability to undermine such labour struggles by hiring expensive 
inter-state workers, buying influence with police and state officials, and the 
internal restructuring of production. Ultimately, we find that diminishing traditional 
brand/retailer power in relation to full package suppliers has given workers 
multiple economic targets. This takes place as full package suppliers consolidate 
supply chains, replacing intrastate workers with interstate workers, and are 
empowered with new accesses of surplus value.  
The study is based on extensive field research conducted over a three-year 
period from 2012 to 2015 including participant observation, company data, and 
semi-structured interviews with workers, labour activists, labour monitors. Much 
of the company data are derived from annual reports and corporate databases 
such as Capital IQ. A total of 27 interviews were conducted with Arvind workers, 
managers, union organizers and international factory auditors. Interviews were 
conducted in person and, except for an English-speaking factory auditor, were 
translated from Kannada by the author. Interviews were conducted with a 
recorder and I took additional written notes on non-vocal speech that I observed. 
They typically lasted between 40 minutes and several hours sometimes over the 
course of many months. Names have been altered for anonymity.  
Notably, at the end of 2012 as Garment and Textile Workers’ Union leaders in 
Ramnaraga were being targeted for violence by management-side workers and 
security guards. In one particularly brutal attack, a worker was severely beaten 
and rushed to the hospital. I accompanied workers to the hospital, then to the 
police station, and was followed and verbally threatened by a number of 
management-side workers. I recorded and reported these threats to an 
international monitoring organization. The organization was given access to the 
site at the request of the brand, PVH, to conduct an independent investigation. 
The organization asked if I could be the Kannada interpreter, since the only other 
person fluent in both Kannada and English was the PVH representative. For 
three days, I translated interviews with senior management, dozens of workers, 
and an executive from Arvind headquarters. Since my role was as an interpreter, 
none of the interviews conducted during the investigation were used directly in 
this paper. However, I did gain invaluable theoretical insights that I have applied 
here; in particular, I noticed the relative powerlessness of the PVH representative 
vis-a`-vis the Arvind executive. These personal dynamics prompted my interest in 
examining the changing power relationship between buyers and producers.  
Two decades of anti-sweatshop campaigns  
The garment sector capital is marked by its ability to shift, maneuver, and 
relocate production at the slightest advance by organized labour on the factory 
floor with few sunk costs. Therefore, despite their efforts, traditional trade unions 
have faltered in establishing a foothold in outsourced manufacturing companies 
that, until recently, operated exclusively at the behest of the transnational brands 
they produce for.  
Since globalization, an abundance of methods mobilized to confront the abysmal 
conditions workers face in the Global South. Approaches spanned from ‘fair 
trade’ and International Framework Agreements to more voluntary codes of 
conduct and the inclusion of the ‘social clause’ in trade agreements. Today, there 
is a sense of acceptance among union activists and scholars that, despite some 
isolated successes, two decades of effort to establish workers’ rights in the 
garment supply chain have done little to impact conditions. In fact, while the 
garment sector remains ‘essentially unchanged’ after twenty years of anti- 
sweatshop efforts (Anner et al., 2012: 2), garment worker wages in real terms fell 
between 2001 and 2011 in most producing countries (WRC, 2013).  
Garment trade unions of the Global North initially reacted to capital flight and 
deindustrialization with calls for protectionism, blaming so-called ‘cheap’ workers 
in the South, making little effort to develop links between the two spheres 
(Brooks, 2007; Kabeer and Mahmud, 2004). The 1990s, however, witnessed a 
rapid expansion of global capital and with it an eruption of anti-sweatshop 
solidarity campaigns specifically targeting major clothing transnational 
corporations. The early 2000s saw a wave of animated grassroots anti- capitalist 
protest on the heels of the historic convergence of environmental and labour 
activists (‘teamster and turtle’) against the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 
alongside the development of a global resistance to neoliberal globalization. An 
oppositional consensus began to take shape by workers and activists in both 
spheres of the globe. Yet despite widespread campaigning, the conditions of 
garment workers remained largely unchanged and almost every unionization 
effort resulted in major brands ‘cutting and running’ to another site of production 
(Kumar and Mahoney, 2014).  
Owing to the growth of sweatshops, the 1990s saw a surge in students and 
activists respond to expensive big-brand marketing by making demands on 
transnational corporations. Transnational corporations in the garment sector 
responded to the flurry of anti- sweatshop activity in the Global North by 
immediately introducing ‘codes of conduct’. Codes of conduct were meant to 
inform consumers to choose products with higher ethical standards, sometimes 
including third-party monitoring of working conditions such as the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA) or the Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC). While many codes 
included language on forced and child labour, few, if any, initially included many 
of the rights enshrined in the ILO core conventions – this included collective 
bargaining or freedom of association rights (Sethi, 2002).  
Notwithstanding this, alongside one of the only successful factory unionization 
cases at Fruit of the Loom factories in Honduras (see Kumar and Mahoney, 
2014), there was the 2001 campaign at the Korean-owned Kukdong factory in 
Mexico – a factory that supplied collegiate apparel for the sports brands Nike and 
Reebok. Workers went on strike after their employer denied them the right to 
form a union and what ensued was a standoff between U. S. student activists, 
who had direct contact with workers, and college administrators who had direct 
contact with brand executives. In its conclusion, the dual tactic of worker action 
and consumer solidarity resulted in the reinstating of all the sacked workers, 
recognition of the union, and collective bargaining (Hermanson, 2013). This 
multi-pronged campaign strategy ensured that action on the ground led by 
garment factory workers dovetailed with codes of conduct and a consumer 
boycotts, ultimately built sufficient power to challenge transnational brands 
enough to change workplace practices.  
Today, the code of conduct model within a consumer choice regime continues to 
remain the strategy of many Global North ‘anti-sweatshop’ or ‘fair trade’ NGOs, 
yet originally codes of conduct proliferated as a direct result of trade union 
pressure (Hale and Wills, 2011; Murphy, 2004). There is a body of literature 
analysing the effectiveness of establishing workers’ rights solely through 
consumer choice of the Global North. Some conclude that these codes have 
proven useful as leverage during a corporate campaign, however, the voluntary 
nature of codes have made issues of enforceability nearly impossible (Compa 
and Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, 1995; Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999; Herrnstadt, 
2000; Hong, 2000; Liubicic, 1998; Rasche, 2010) and still others claim that codes 
not only mirror, but also entrench the asymmetrical power relations between 
‘neo-colonial’ and consumer-end development modes (Freidberg, 2003; Hughes, 
2006; Hughes and Reimer, 2004). Indeed, other ‘top down’ initiatives in labour-
intensive sectors – such as labour protections in trade agreements (Campling et 
al., 2016) or CSR initiatives (Mezzadri, 2014) – have been found to be largely 
ineffective or the research framework flawed. While NGOs and transnational 
corporations tend to support codes of conduct (Braun and Gearhart, 2004; 
Compa, 2004; Compa and Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, 1995; Kolk and Van Tulder, 
2002; Locke and Romis, 2006; Sethi, 2002), trade unions tend to call the 
expansion of trade union rights as the enforcement of workers’ rights from the 
shop floor (Gallin, 2001; Howse, 1999; Taylor and Bain, 2001).  
The varying perspectives on how to respond to and resolve worker exploitation in 
the garment industry reflect wider ideological, political, and strategic differences: 
those who represent international aid organizations and transnational 
corporations have tended to either overtly or tacitly support codes of conduct, 
while trade unions have tended to support the creation and support of trade 
unions to enforce workers’ rights.  
Workers’ self organization as human rights  
From as early as the late 19th-century, due to the vertical disintegration of the 
garment sector, workers sought to put pressure at both points of production and 
consumption (Collins, 2009). The International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 
for example, leveraging buyers (brands, retailers) through secondary pickets and 
boycotts and relied on the language of both human rights and solidarity to win 
converts from outside the shopfloor. It was precisely this tactic that was 
internationalized with the global garment sector (Seidman, 2009).  
However, the allocation of rights remains conflicted within international legal and 
governance regimes. Many scholars of business and human rights presuppose 
moral imperatives for capital or institutional applicability of universal declarations 
(Hsien, 2017). Take Hoffman and McNulty (2009: 114) whose critique is 
premised with the ‘recognition that even under optimal conditions, good 
companies sometimes are susceptible to moral lapses’. Both the problem and 
the solution are understood as individualistic. Thus, the human rights literature is 
littered with moral, legal (Buhmann, 2006), third sector (Outhwaite and Martin- 
Ortega, 2017) or trade agreement (Compa and Diamond, 2003) solutions to 
human rights abuses. Absent from much of this literature is a recognition of the 
underlying logics of capital – competition and exploitation – and the agency of 
workers to collectively change their own conditions.  
However, critiques of human rights are by no means a recent phenomenon. Marx 
(1867) famously wrote that ‘between two rights’ – that of the propriety classes 
and the working class – ‘force decides’. This extends to the neoliberal context, as 
the rights of the dominant social process of capital accumulation through market 
exchange against the rights of workers for economic democracy and collective 
action. Marx applies this to the current mode of production, capitalism, as one 
that pits the rights of workers in direct conflict with the interest of capital. Marx 
(1867) continues, ‘in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what 
is a working-day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between 
collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labor, i.e. the working-
class’.  
Critically, the argument ‘between two rights’ by Marx is less a question of ends – 
certainly, the ILO core conventions’ freedom of association, broadly understood 
as the right to a democratic trade union, is framed within the language of human 
rights – but rather a question of means. The right of a worker to form a union is a 
human right, but more importantly it is the means by which workers can 
collectively confront their employer to win concessions (i.e. wages, benefits). As 
such, the reality of ensuring workers’ rights under globalization, as demonstrated 
in the case herein, lies somewhere in the middle of human rights and class 
antagonism – between the exercise of a universalist language versus the self- 
organization and internationalism of labour, respectively. Relying on the moral 
obligations of corporations, in lieu of an enforceable system of transnational 
regulation, nor the sheer dint of strength demonstrated by workers’ collective 
action, may not deliver sustained workers’ rights under the current conditions.  
Indeed, labour rights and human rights have historically ‘run on tracks that are 
sometimes parallel and rarely meet’ Leary (1996: 22) in which human rights 
organizations focused on issues of political and civil rights (i.e. political prisoners, 
torture or free speech) while the workplace remained the realm of trade unions 
and labour rights organizations (Leary, 1996). Certainly, social movements 
around the world from housing, racial equality, or environmental justice, or where 
trade unions have had difficulty finding footing (immigrant workers, day labourers, 
labour-intensive industries), have increasingly framed their struggles and 
demands, at least in part, through the language of human rights (O’Connell, 
2018).  
Indeed, labour rights are playing a more prominent role within business and 
human rights literature but still relies on the individual decisions of the proprietors 
of capital. For example, Buhmann and Wettstein (2017: 6) cite the 2013 collapse 
at Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh, resulting in over 1000 deaths, as 
caused by the ‘economic decisions to producer under cheap conditions [and] the 
fact that those incidents were not rare but unfortunately common have called for 
critical assessments of decisions of certain firms’. Here, as with much of the 
business and human rights literature, the emphasis is the decision of a few firms. 
This ‘bad apples’ theory cannot coexist with a critique that understands these 
phenomena as part of the underlying logics of capital.
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Go back a century to 1911 to New York City’s towering Triangle Shirtwaist 
Factory. In what emerged as the city’s largest industrial disaster, 146 workers 
lost their lives. Enter the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union whose 
raison d’etre was actualized through collective organization, action, and a 
demand, which challenged the hierarchies of the clothing industry and triggered 
improved working conditions for decades. As such, it was workers – not the 
employers – who eliminated US factory fires till date. Then and now, the garment 
industry structure remained the same. Brand companies at the turn of the 20th-
century maximized profits by creating bidding wars between factory owners. 
Factory owners, in order to stay competitive and survive, would increase 
downward pressures on workers. Workers at the factory-floor end of this chain 
reaction were left with poverty wages, deteriorating workplace standards, and 
increasing incidences of factory fires and collapse. However, with its emphasis 
on individual business decisions (rather than capitalism itself), and business 
solutions (rather than workers’ self-organization), much of the literature and 
language of business and human rights remains incongruent with the history of 
change in the garment sector, or indeed of workers under capitalism.  
The rights of workers and the right to organize trade unions are well established 
in principles 3–6 of the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights as set out by the International Bill of Rights and the 
ILO’s 1998 Declaration (ILO, 1998; UN, 2008, 2011). This is particularly the case 
in instances where formal trade union rights are limited, such as in South China, 
and the language of rights can help raise workers’ consciousness to build 
autonomous organizing and strikes (Chan, 2018). In different ways, workers in 
South China and in South India rely on the twin forces of rights and conflict in 
their struggles. Indeed, it is a confluence of factors including the changing com- 
position of capital, workers’ organization, and transnational activists and 
organizers placing pressure on the various actors in the value chain that assisted 
in the campaign documented in this paper. I argue, in a similar vein to Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen (2018), that as the value chain moves from a short-term 
market-based to a more cooperative hierarchical GVC (Gereffi et al., 2005) – the 
possibilities for workers to utilize ethical frameworks increases. Indeed, codes 
and other rights-based frameworks are tools that are only as powerful as the 
workers and activists who can enforce them.  
Shifting governance  
Gereffi’s original conception divided supply chains into two categories of 
governance: Producer-driven and buyer-driven. Producer-driven chains are those 
in capital-intensive, large transnational manufactures, such as automotive, and 
play a central role in coordinating production networks. Here, value capture at the 
point of production is greatest because of high-barriers to entry with limited 
competition, resulting in enhanced ‘control over backward linkages with raw 
material and component suppliers, and forward linkages into distribution and 
retailing’ (Gereffi, 2002).  
Buyer-driven chains are those in which large retailers and brands are decisive; 
often decentralized, highly competitive, networks requiring labour-intensive 
manufacturing such as garments, footwear, and consumer electronics (Gereffi, 
2002). Gereffi (2002) claims that, profits in buyer-driven chains derive not from 
scale, volume, and technological advances as in producer-driven chains, but 
rather from unique combinations of high-value research, design, sales, 
marketing, and financial services that allow the retailers, designers, and 
marketers to act as strategic brokers in linking overseas factories and traders 
with evolving product niches in the main consumer markets.
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Through this structure brands outsource risk and narrow their focus to high-value 
added activities, maximum profits at minimal capital-investment. Gereffi’s thesis 
contains the implicit premise that production and consumption are delinked, a 
fact exacerbated, and spatialized, after the relocation of manufacturing between 
1960s and 1990s – globalization. This original typology, of two conflicting ideal-
types, has since been developed to capture the full range of commodity and 
value chain governance (see Gereffi et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2002). This 
research is inspired by Gereffi et al. (2005) which moves beyond the duality of 
buyer and producer-driven framework. However, labour agency and power within 
the value chain is noticeably absent.  
By treating Gereffi’s original binary more as two ends of a spectrum, we can 
measure the bargaining power of workers in the value chain and in doing so 
inform effective workers’ strategies. Understanding the GVC with producer-driven 
and buyer-driven at either extremes allows us to home in on the changing 
composition of manufacturing firms as it is reflected on the labour process and 
workers’ bargaining power. I argue that the dominance of ‘full package’ garment 
suppliers, once assembly-only Cut-Make-Trim firms that have integrated across 
the supply chain into higher-value sectors, is giving the relationship between 
‘producer’ and ‘buyer’ an increasingly symbiotic character, dramatically affecting 
power dynamics, and offering a new opportunity for every challenge it presents 
for workers’ resistance in the global garment industry.
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Spatial inflexibility and workers’ structural power  
To understand workers’ rights in the garment value chain, one must understand 
that it is the combined force of material conditions (the composition of capital) 
and subjective agency (structural/associational power) that result in positive or 
negative labour bargaining outcomes. Wright (2000) draws a distinction between 
structural power, derived from workers’ location in the economic system, and 
associational power, a product of workers’ collective organization. Indeed, the 
history of the garment sector can be read as the former opening up the 
possibilities for the latter. The degree of monopsony power is articulated through 
what I identify as the degree of spatial inflexibility, which is reflected in labour’s 
bargaining power. Greater spatial inflexibility results in greater bargaining power 
for workers. This concept builds on Harvey’s notion of the ‘spatial fix’, which is 
capital’s use of space to absorb its crisis of profitability. There are two, 
sometimes overlapping, forms of spatial inflexibility: regulatory and market.  
Take, as the case, the history of the garment sector. Between the 1920s and the 
early 1970s, a high degree of regulatory spatial inflexibility resulted in greater 
structural opportunities for the assertion of associational power resulted in higher 
labour bargaining power, crystalized through trade unions and collective 
bargaining agreements. Before the economic crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, 
garment workers in the advanced capitalist world, particularly the US and UK, 
capitalized on a measure of structural and associational power brought on by 
national protectionist policies that restricted the flow of capital and goods. This 
capped the monopsonistic power of buyers while also allowing the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union to ‘chase the work’ within border of the US and 
in parts of Canada. The economic crisis led to trade liberalization; a lower degree 
of regulatory spatial inflexibility, as capital began outsourcing production beyond 
its borders intensifying its degree of monopsony power whilst curtailing the power 
of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union.  
However, pressure from Global North trade unions resulted in the signing of the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement. The agreement operated ostensibly as a global trade 
agreement that established quota limits on the amount of garments produced in 
the Global South for consumption in the Global North. The result was a high 
geographic spread while ensuring a minimal degree of regulatory spatial 
inflexibility. The regulatory spatial inflexibility was low enough to ensure that 
attempts by workers to assert associational power would be counteracted 
through a spatial fix and the relocation of outsourced capital. The Multi-Fiber 
Agreement phase-out saw the end of the last vestiges of regulatory spatial 
inflexibility. Global buyers moved production from the far-flung corners of the 
globe to a handful of labour-rich countries and a higher degree of monopsony 
power saw a fall in the structural power of workers and a sharp increase in the 
share of value captured by buyers (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson, 2012). 
Finally, as manufacturing firms began consolidating – due to the downward 
pressure by global buyers – the degree of monopsony power fell and we witness 
the emergence of what I call market spatial inflexibility. 
Indeed, attempts to establish workers’ rights through a rights-based framework 
were limited by the structural phenomenon of low degree of spatial inflexibility. 
However, the logics of competition resulted in increased firm consolidated, 
intensifying the share of value captured at the bottom of the global value chain, 
and raising barriers to entry. This emergent market spatial inflexibility increases 
in the relative structural power of workers due to low a Degree of Monopsony 
Power, economies of scale, and increased sunk costs due to increased 
automation. Ultimately, as is demonstrated in the paper, structural power (and in 
some cases associational power) increases alongside the degree of market 
spatial inflexibility.  
From mill to retail  
India was relatively late to liberalization. It was not until the 1990s that export-
oriented garment production began to proliferate in India, and only towards the 
end of the first decade of the 2000s that large Indian garment firms began 
establishing beachheads in transnational markets. The constitutive forces of 
‘liberalization’ – increased access to foreign capital, greater domestic purchasing 
power, deregulated foreign direct investment – explain these changes. Gupta 
and Qiu (2013: 57) elaborate:  
Market liberalization was the root of unleashing this trading potential, by 
empowering the Indian firms to participate in the global capital and investment 
markets. Many firms, such as Moser Baer in optical media, Bharat Forge in auto 
components, Reliance in polyester yarn, Arvind Mills in denim fabric, and Zee 
Telefilms in satellite television channels, become global category leaders.  
Appelbaum (2008) describes the economic benefits of consolidation in China 
where globalization matured before India. He cites manufacturer, Luen Thai 
Holdings, which created a ‘supply-chain city’ in Guangdong Province that 
includes a product-development centre, a 4000-worker capacity on-site 
dormitory, and a two-million square foot factory. Luen Thai buyers (like Liz 
Claiborne) soon became a one-stop-shop where designers meet directly with 
both factory and textile mill technicians, bringing the whole supply chain under 
one roof. Now Liz Claiborne plans to downsize its network of 250 suppliers in 35 
countries to only a handful, including Luen Thai. Under this plan Liz Claiborne 
and Luen Thai anticipate reducing staff by 40%, which will cut costs and improve 
turnaround times, through logistic harmonization (Appelbaum, 2008).  
An economy of scale geared toward producing primarily a single product is likely, 
for obvious reasons, to undercut more diversified competitors. In addition to Luen 
Thai, global suppliers like Panarub (Adidas’ exclusive cleats producer in 
Indonesia) and Yue Yuen (which does exclusive shoe production for Nike) 
provide additional examples of large capital holding companies that have 
upgraded to produce highly efficient specialized product lines, and have thereby 
become crucial ‘strategic partners’ for major brands.  
Despite Gereffi (2014) contention that this consolidation occurred when buyers – 
driven to reduce transaction and monitoring – began working with fewer and 
fewer suppliers resulting in the consolidation at the manufacturing end of the 
value chain. The question for buyers is now ‘how can we “rationalise” our supply 
chains from 300–500 suppliers to 25– 30 suppliers?’ (Gereffi, 2014: 15). 
Certainly, the reduction of their source price buyers facilitated the consolidation 
of manufacturers. But as Galanis and Kumar (2018) articulate, this phenomenon 
is not a top-down decision by buyers but the consequence of the underlying 
logics of global competition. Galanis and Kumar (2018) introduce the concept of 
Degree of Monopsony Power as essential in determining the share of value 
captured by buyers in the GVC. In their model, higher Degree of Monopsony 
Power leads in greater share of value capture by buyers resulting in increased 
downward pressure on producers. In this way, if Degree of Monopsony Power is 
rising then the ‘buyer-driven’ dynamics of the value chain are intensified. 
Conversely, when Degree of Monopsony Power falls then the value chain takes 
on a more ‘producer-driven’ character. This explains the move towards 
consolidation.  
But critically, these giant suppliers located in the ‘rising power’ have themselves 
emerged as giant contractors in the Global South (Nadvi, 2014). The growth of 
these suppliers and the transformation of the value chain is reflective of the 
larger structural transformation and economic development the Global South 
countries. Horner and Nadvi (2018) cite a number of factors that explain these 
changes. Firstly, nearly half of global manufacturing is now sourced from the 
Global South. Second, Global South is estimated to increase from 32% in 2010 
to nearly half of global consumption by 2025. Lastly, South-South has replaced 
South-North as the dominant flow of global trade flows.  
Evolving workers’ strategies  
There remains a dearth of research on the rise of large producers and the 
repositioning of the drivers of GVC governance (exceptions include Appelbaum, 
2008; 2009; Azmeh and Nadvi, 2014; Gereffi, 2014; Merk, 2014). Indeed, 
drivenness is a crucial variable in determining the shape of GVCs (Bair, 2009; 
Gereffi, 1994) and changes in GVC governance determine the bargaining power 
of workers (Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011).
7 It has been shown that in the original 
development of the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) framework labour remained 
at best subordinate within commodity and value chain analysis (Selwyn, 2013). 
As Smith et al. (2002: 47) stated, ‘insofar as “workers” are present in this 
literature, they appear as passive victims as capital seeks cheap labor’. Later, the 
development of Global Production Network (GPN) literature brought more actors 
into the fold and contributed valuable insights in understanding the process of 
value capture in commodity production. However, labour continued to remain 
largely ancillary. As Coe and Martin (2013: 5) point out, with some notable 
exceptions (Alford et al., 2017; Cumbers et al., 2008; Lund-Thomsen, 2013; 
Lund-Thomsen and Coe, 2015; Newsome et al., 2015; Rainnie et al., 2011; 
Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011; Sportel, 2013), GPN literature has hitherto ‘been 
largely silent on the issue of labor agency’.  
The Asian garment firms given a boost by liberalization established widely 
dispersed supply chains without losing functional integration. They eliminated 
middlemen and inched ever closer to the source of their income, the customer. In 
the course of this ascension retailers acted as proxies, effecting a shift from a 
producer-driven marketplace to one that is consumer-led. Tewari (2006) explains 
India’s flourishing clothing production, despite relatively low sectoral foreign 
investment, as a result of a burgeoning domestic market. Bangalore, where much 
of the Arvind’s supply network is based, accounts for 30% of India’s garment 
production and 8,00,000 of its 6 million garment workers (Mallikarjunappa, 2011). 
Since the mid-1990s, the top 20–30 textile and apparel firms have begun 
introducing domestic brands, like Parx (Raymond) and Indian Terrain (Celebrity 
Fashion Limited) (Jin et al., 2013).  
Previously, the divide between the source of value creation (production) and 
value capture (brands and retail) had forced workers to make demands of 
buyers, rather than their direct employers. This often had to be accomplished 
through Global North allies, like the Global Justice Movement’s ‘anti-sweatshop’ 
campaigns of the 1990s and 2000s (Brooks, 2007; Kreider, 2002). Global North 
activists were asked to compel brands and retailers through secondary economic 
pressure or other tactics to take responsibility for the conditions in outsourced 
factories, since they had the power to impose labour standards on suppliers. This 
kind of response sought to close the growing gap between workers and the 
brand executives that controlled the industry, with a few rather isolated 
successes limited to large institutional purchases (Kumar and Mahoney, 2014).  
The asymmetry of power between buyer and supplier exists also at the point of 
consumption. As Merk (2008: 82) states,  
Manufacturers produce shoes that are distributed and sold under 
the name of the contractor [i.e. the brand] and little control is 
exercised over (retail) market outlets in Western countries. 
Generally speaking, their lack of control over large market outlets 
renders them dependent.  
These socio-economic factors caused campaigns at the point of consumption to 
become an important lever against brands to achieve gains for workers at the 
point of production (Brooks, 2007; Kreider, 2002).  
Conventional export-oriented units in the garment sector undermine worker 
campaigns to organize through systematic harassment and retaliatory 
dismissals. If the union is established the company is likely to be driven from the 
market as transnational brands take orders elsewhere. The early campaigns to 
unionize in the 1980s and 1990s therefore had predictable results. As described 
by Kumar (2014) the strategy of the workers’ union, the Garment and Textile 
Workers’ Union, was to adopt a ‘community organizing’ model by establishing a 
‘women workers’ front’. Shortly after, Garment and Textile Workers’ Union began 
to incorporate a brand strategy, targeting large global brands with the assistance 
of allies at the point of consumption. As outlined in detail in this paper, under 
pressure during the struggle at the Arvind Warehouse in Ramnagara, Garment 
and Textile Workers’ Union evolved practices targeting full package suppliers 
while simultaneously placing secondary pressure on brands.  
From a cotton mill to a full package supplier  
Arvind Limited is the flagship company of the Lalbhai Group, the largest 
manufacturer of denim in India, and amongst the top three manufacturers and 
distributors of denim in the world (Reuters, 2007; Singh, 2012). The company 
owns the cotton mills, garment factories, distribution and retail outlets of cotton 
shirts, knits, khakis, and denim for major transnational brands of PVH 
Corporation (which include Tommy Hilfiger, Calvin Klein, IZOD, and Arrow), 
alongside Gap and others across South Asia and the Middle-East.  
Established in 1931, Arvind, along with thousands of other producers, was borne 
out of the demand for domestically produced fabric, part of Mahatma Gandhi’s 
call for boycott of imported fabric, or the ‘Swadeshi Movement’. Arvind emerged 
as the sole survivor among over 85 textile mills that made their home in 
Ahmedabad three decades ago entirely as a consequence of their decision to 
transform from a multi-product company to primarily a denim manufacturer 
(Sampler and Sarkar, 2010). Until 1987, all available denim in India was 
imported. That year Arvind became the first mill in the country to produce denim, 
a key initiator and beneficiary of India’s ‘denim revolution’.  
Arvind was a well-known textile mill with trusted distribution channels throughout 
India producing high quality traditional Indian clothing such as voiles, dhotis, and 
sarees.
8 In 1986, Arvind began investing in increasing its production capability, 
erecting its first denim facility with a capacity of 10 million meters per annum, and 
under Arvind’s ‘renovision’ strategy expanded its products marketed as ‘high-
quality premium niche’ to the international market. Small-scale power looms 
simply could not compete with the large scale, high quality, timely turnaround 
expected by U.S. buyers. As Sampler and Sarkar (2010: 74) state, these 
requirements ‘meant that manufacturers would have to invest in capital-intensive 
technology, large scale as well as better management of operations’. The 
company’s success in India quickly expanded outward and it soon began selling 
its material to leading transnational brands of denim such as Levis, Wrangler, 
and Lee. Technological upgrading and increased capacity made Arvind an 
important partner to transnational brands and by 1990 it had opened up offices in 
New York, Hong Kong, and London (Choudhury, 2001).  
Jeans were inextricably linked to the aesthetic of the young urban Indian and with 
each successive year, with more expendable cash in the pockets of India’s urban 
residents, the increased affordability of jeans saw an ever-expanding consumer 
base. By 1991, the company was selling 100 million meters of denim per year 
and within a year they had upgraded a number of plants further increasing 
production and cost cutting. By the mid-1990s, Arvind had expanded across the 
supply chain with separate textile, garment and telecom divisions to create 
harmonized supply chains that provided global brands with greater comparative 
economies of scale, increasing Arvinds’ capacity and profits.  
Around the same time in the 1990s, Arvind expanded the consumer base of 
jeans outside of the urban centres to the villages, by creating an in-house low-
cost brand RufNTuf. The strategy led to a second explosion of jeans, and Arvind 
sold over a million pieces within the first two months (Shah, 2000). This massive 
expansion of Arvind’s denim capacity was funded largely by domestic financiers 
and overseas financial institutions, the latter made easier in post-reform India 
(D’silva and Joseph, 2014). Simultaneously, Arvind began using capital 
generated from denim sales to diversify its production portfolio, bolstering its non-
denim technological upgrading by breaking ground on India’s largest state-of-the-
art shirting, gabardine and knits facility. However by the late-1990s, a shift in 
fashion trends led to a crash in denim prices and Arvind had to restructure its 
debts in order to repay its increasingly onerous international debts. By 2001, 
Arvind had the ‘distinction of becoming the first Indian corporation to restructure 
its entire debt in a single go’ (D’silva and Joseph, 2014: 46).  
By the early 2000s, Arvind had ‘moved on from being a commodity player to a 
value provider from South Asia’ (Sampler and Sarkar, 2010: 68). Arvind was 
initially hit hard by falling input prices and revenues brought on by the 2005 
phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Agreement when China offloaded nearly 40% of the 
world’s denim, severely undercutting global denim prices and Arvind’s 
competitive advantage. In time, however, the Multi-Fiber Agreement would assist 
Arvind’s market share, as already hard-pressed powerloom or handloom 
weavers were now saddled with the cost of meeting India’s Central Value-Added 
Tax.
9  
These smaller member-controlled handloom cooperatives had been encouraged 
through macroeconomic policy of the post-independence Nehruvian state and 
were now collapsing under the weight of both international and domestic 
competitive pressures. As small capitals began to quickly vanish larger capitals 
like Arvind would take over, realizing exponential growth in their market share. 
Indeed, India would become a prime beneficiary of the Post-Multi-Fiber 
Agreement world, with India rising to become one of the world’s foremost cotton 
producers with a global market share of 25%.  
The first export boom grew out of a demand for handloom garments rather than 
through foreign capital in the form of foreign direct investment. Throughout the 
1980s into the 2000s, while China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Latin American 
relied on foreign capital for rapid export-oriented growth, India’s garment sector 
advanced primarily through direct sales between medium-sized indigenous 
producers to medium-sized retailers and buyers – first in the EU then in the US 
(Kar, 2015). Recent years have seen the announcement of major mergers and 
acquisitions of Indian apparel brands and manufacturers.
10 In particular, studies 
of the sector in Tirupur, Mumbai, and Greater Delhi areas found that most firms 
experienced greater process and functional upgrading across the value chain 
from lower value production phase to higher value such as design (Ray et al., 
2016).  
The emergence of a transnational producer–retailer  
Today, Arvind is a conglomerate of seven diversified divisions with their own 
brands.
11 The expansion in Arvind’s retail division is a crucial component of its 
comparative advantage and appeal to transnational clothing capital. Crucially, in 
2007, Arvind magnified its brand and retail division with the creation of MegaMart 
in addition to Club America. Almost, 45% of Arvind’s retail sales are its own 
brands while international brands account for the remainder. The company 
expanded its services to include low-cost product design for transnational brands 
by hiring a team of international fashion designers, which is the clearest 
indication of its extension to the high value phases in the supply chain. A sign of 
Arvind’s growing value to buyers is in its ability to negotiate stability of orders by 
requiring buyers to enter long-term purchasing contracts (Sampler and Sarkar, 
2010), lowering Arvind’s liability in an inherently volatile fashion sector and 
aggregating its competitive market advantages.  
By integrating various phases of the value chain Arvind has kept its costs low 
allowing it to invest heavily in Research and Development (R&D). Arvind spends 
5% of its annual turnover on R&D, leading to technological advances like the 
modified airjet looms as well as slasher technology in dying operations making 
Arvind’s ‘vertically integrated plant[s] among the most modern in the world’ 
(Sampler and Sarkar, 2010: 70). Arvind’s technological advances have 
contributed to economic upgrading and a 50% reduction in its manufacturing 
costs over time (Shukla, 1998), allowing it to expand even more rapidly, further 
cornering the denim market and becoming an indispensible partner to 
transnational brands. This represents a departure from the low R&D investment 
that has become a trademark for Indian companies (Bound and Thornton, 2012).  
By 2011, Arvind began its transition to become a transnational full package 
supplier. Importantly, Arvind announced it would set up a large-scale garment 
factory in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nathan, 2014). Additionally, it secured long-
term production, marketing, and retail packaged licensing contracts with major 
transnational brands across South Asia and the Middle East for PVH brands 
such as IZOD in 2011 (PVH, 2011) and a 50:50 joint venture to open 500 stores 
with Tommy Hilfiger in 2012 (Bailay, 2013). Then, in 2013, Arvind entered 
international undergarment retail by becoming the exclusive licensee for major 
undergarment markets and becoming licensed to sell Hanes in India.  
In 2014, Arvind announced that it would enter a full package agreements with the 
largest casual wear retailer in the U.S., Gap, expanding from production to 
distribution, marketing, managing Gap’s Indian e-commerce on its newly 
announced platform, in order to open 40 stores for Gap beginning in 2015. For 
Gap’s South Asian debut it chose to franchise with Arvind, with whom it had a 
long-standing relationship for denim manufacture, despite 100% foreign direct 
investment being permitted in India for single brand retailers.  
Arvind has seen year-on-year growth rates, doubling its annual revenue between 
2004 and 2010 and doubling it again between 2010 and the end of 2014, with 
annual profits increasing by 26% in 2011 and by 30% in 2014 alone. Thus, 
Arvind’s continual expansion geographically and across the value chain has 
increased its economy of scale and bargaining power in the clothing commodity 
chain to secure longer-term contracts, including the full breadth of clothing 
manufacture off the success of its denim sector, further cementing its relationship 
with buyers.  
Arvind’s strategy today is to provide transnational brands and large retailers with 
the full production package, from cotton mill to retail rack, having integrated most 
of the clothing commodity chain including textiles manufacture, garment 
production, marketing, design, with a vast network of ever-expanding retail 
outlets, a GPS-based fleet automation and management for logistics as well as 
in-house warehousing facilities and, crucially, invaluable access to India’s retail 
market.  
Arvind warehouse workers’ struggle  
One of Arvind’s primary distribution sites was at a warehouse an hour’s drive 
southwest of Bangalore in the town of Ramnagara. While Arvind owns the 
Ramnagara warehouse, the building itself is leased for another 20 years, 
according to one manager, who claims that Arvind owns only one of the three 
floors. In 2011, the Ramnagara warehouse handled cataloguing, inventory, and 
international distribution in South Asia and in the Middle East, primarily for 
transnational brands owned by PVH.  
PVH brands alongside Gant and US Polo were distributed through the 
Ramnagara warehouse. Arrow had established a long-term full package contract 
with Arvind, which had first hosted the brand to India in 1993. In 2011, Arvind 
signed an eight-year full package licensing contract, alongside a renewal option 
that would extend that agreement until 2029, with Arvind to produce, market, and 
retail Izod throughout India, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Bhutan, Madagascar, Seychelles, Oman, Yemen, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka and Maldives (PVH, 2011). At the time, the major distribution node 
between the point of production and consumption was the distribution site in 
Ramnagara.
12  
Before the beginning of the workers’ unrest at the end of 2010, the site was a 
‘pressing warehouse’, which meant it had five areas of responsibility: ironing, 
fabric testing, fabric distribution, accessories distribution, and alterations. 
Warehouse worker Jayram
13 recounts the primary tasks,  
Garments arrived inward and categorized into inventory, placed on 
racks and coded. The outward department received directions 
electronically from the head office specifying which garments, how 
many pieces, what sizes, and to which country. The system 
operator then gives the directions to helpers, who direct the pickers. 
Next the helpers bring clothes to a scanner while another registers 
the code and where the clothes will be delivered. Workers place the 
box of clothes for the dispatcher to ensure it is picked up and ready 
be taken to its destination.  
During the seasonal rush, the numbers of interstate workers at the warehouse 
would swell with short-term ‘job workers’ (temporary workers) brought in mostly 
from north India.
14 As another worker, Ratnamma,
15 explained,  
A “job worker” is like a coolie (a worker for hire). They are brought 
in to work for the day and do not get any social benefits like 
healthcare or pensions and are paid by piece-rate rather than a 
salary, paid weekly rather than monthly, but their lodging and food 
are paid for by the factory.  
Temporary workers end up costing the factory more in the short-term but flexible 
terms are essential within the seasonal garment sector and, as we will see in the 
case of Arvind, a crucial bulwark against worker organizing.  
In November 2010, the General Manager (GM) of the warehouse called all the 
workers to the floor and announced that Arvind would close the warehouse, 
shifting work to a new warehouse in Hosakote. In the past five years, Arvind has 
built a number of new warehouses in and around Bangalore to facilitate its 
growth including in Whitefield, Hosakote, and Chintamani. The reason given to 
workers for the move was that the building had been leaking during the rainy 
season and would be prohibitively expensive to repair. The GM told the workers 
they could get employment in the new locations, but nearly all decided to stay in 
Ramnagara. A few asked that the company provide a bus to Hosakote but the 
GM refused, offering two to three months’ salary as a severance package for 
those who declined.  
Arvind worker Santosh
16 recalls,  
None of us said anything after this announcement, we began 
discussing amongst ourselves, and one of the workers Nirmala had 
previously worked at an Arvind garment factory in Peenya Industrial 
Area in Bangalore which had a union fight a few years back. 
Nirmala tracked down the union contact from her sister who still 
worked there and that’s how we joined the union.  
Upon arriving, Garment and Textile Workers’ Union organizers asked how far the 
workers were willing to go, as Kempraju
17 recalls, ‘we told [Garment and Textile 
Workers’ Union organizers] that we were willing to lay our bodies in front of the 
gates to stop the closure’. Within days 70% of the workforce had joined the 
union. By December 2010, the workers were given some critical information, as 
Nirmala
18 recounts,  
A driver at the Arvind transport company SpeedX once worked in 
the warehouse and still had friends there. One of the workers at the 
warehouse received a call from the transport worker stating that he 
had heard Arvind had called a large number of trucks to 
Ramnagara. So we were ready.  
The workers had strong suspicions that Arvind planned to move the equipment 
that night. Another worker, Krishna,
19 recalls, ‘we waited nearby until one truck 
went in the gates and immediately called all the workers’. By 10 p.m., there were 
one hundred local workers assembled outside of the factory gates alongside 
members from Suwarna, a popular Kannada-language news channel. The 
workers began picketing and laid down their bodies in front of the gates refusing 
to let mover trucks leave the premises. The Arvind warehouse sits on the main 
artery that runs through Ramnagara and so word quickly spread. Local 
community organizations began rallying their own members and the crowd began 
to grow. Within a few hours, dozens of police arrived at the behest of the 
management. The crowd continued to swell and hundreds of community 
members, workers and their family put their bodies on the ground, picketed, and 
chanted.  
Finally, as Jayram
20 recounted, ‘in the early morning the GM finally stepped out 
of the gates and announced that they would not close down the factory and the 
crowd erupted with celebration’.  
On January of 2012, after a year of union education and membership 
strengthening, Garment and Textile Workers’ Union submitted a Charter of 
Demands, which would have resulted in union recognition and collective 
bargaining at Arvind. The threshold for filing a Charter of Demands is 10% of the 
workforce, and in the middle of 2012 the union density at Arvind had reached an 
unparalleled 70%.  
For most of 2012, the union would be attacked and its membership undermined. 
Kempraju,
21 another union leader at the warehouse, indicated how the 
warehouse management began exerting pressure on the union,  
Once our union became bigger [. . .] management offered union 
leaders money and promotions to switch allegiances, which turned 
to threats; then they began to bring in contract workers mostly from 
[the north-eastern state of] Assam, and finally they began to 
physically attack us. 
By November 2012, the abuse at Arvind had reached a fever pitch. That month, 
a number of union-side workers were violently attacked by management-side 
workers at the direction of the HR managers. Following the attack, four union 
leaders were terminated from employment. Garment and Textile Workers’ Union 
sought the assistance of a number of international allies including the 
International Union League for Brand Responsibility and United Students Against 
Sweatshops. Since collegiate apparel was produced at the facility, an 
international labor rights organization initiated an investigation into factory 
conditions. Protests were conducted at US college campuses as Garment and 
Textile Workers’ Union members targeting Arvind retailers for pickets and actions 
in Bangalore and Mysore. As with other factory cases, the codes of conduct were 
invoked as a means to pressure university administrators to put pressure on PVH 
to put pressure on Arvind. After a month-long campaign and due to 
internal/external pressures and the union campaign workers were rehired with 
back pay.  
Reorganizing production to undermine the union  
Over the course of the union campaign it was revealed, and later confirmed in a 
district labour court decision, that Arvind operated unlawfully without a contract 
license and failed to compensate workers legally mandated overtime. In addition, 
it came to light that management had begun laying the groundwork to convert the 
warehouse from a ‘pressing warehouse’ to a ‘returns warehouse’ following 
Garment and Textile Workers’ Union submitting a Charter of Demands. A 
pressing warehouse is a primary node between in-house production and 
disintegrated international consumption, with clothes arriving directly from 
Arvind’s manufacturing facilities and distributed directly to brand-name retailers. 
A ‘returns warehouse’ functions as a site for handling rejected garments, 
repackaging clothes originally destined for the international market into garments 
for domestic consumption.  
By early 2013, Arvind began the ‘returns warehouse’ transformation with the 
Ramnagara’s pressing functions being moved to a new facility in Chintamani on 
the eastern part of Karnataka. Within a few months, the facility had become a site 
of returned products (or ‘returns warehouse’).
22 Santosh
23 believed this 
transformation of the warehouse was directly linked to workers’ actions,  
It’s clear why [Arvind management] did this, they know our union is 
strong and if we went on strike it would cost the company greatly 
as a pressing warehouse, but as a returns warehouse the impact 
would be minimal because those items are non-essential and not 
headed for international retailers.  
The transformation from pressing to returns warehouse reduces liabilities by 
transferring international to domestic, core to peripheral, functions. Other workers 
shared similar suspicions suggesting that a one-day strike alone at the pressing 
warehouse during season would cost the company immensely, but as a returns 
warehouses the impact would be negligible.  
As of November 2014, the union had 80 members, rising from its nadir of 25 at 
the end of 2013. Even though the number of workers has remained consistently 
at 150 and the workload had remained stable throughout, Arvind has begun 
replacing local Ramnagara workers with roughly 50 temporary workers brought in 
from Goa, Assam, and Orissa, up from 20 in 2010. In early 2014 after reading a 
company press release on the Internet, Arvind warehouse union members began 
demanding a 20% increase in their wages, citing Arvind’s profits and the 
announcement of the opening of 500 new stores.  
Mangala
24 stated, ‘when we approached management they opened a file and 
showed us that although they made profits, those were redirected towards 
opening more retail shops’. Despite the company’s denials of profit numbers, 
union members continued to exert pressure on the company to increase workers’ 
wages. As Rajanna
25 from Arvind stated,  
Smaller garment companies I have worked for have never had 
profits for us to demand higher wages from, they use their small 
profits to make us work more and for less money, and even when 
they do have profits they are not as publicly available as Arvind. . . 
even if Arvind lie to us we can find out the truth easily because it’s 
a big public company.  
Jayram
26 stated that workers have begun looking into other ways to pressure the 
company, ‘we are now reaching out to Arvind production facilities near 
Ramnagara in Kengari and textile as well’.  
Arvind employs temporary workers despite having to pay for workers’ individual 
lodging, transport and three meals a day. As Krishna
27 states,  
[Arvind] are afraid of the union and don’t hire local workers and because 
the temporary workers are under constant supervision, we cannot access 
them. They’re also much more fearful [...] they’re in a different land and 
don’t speak the language, with no community, and owe their food, bed, 
and transport to the company.  
Jayram
28 adds, ‘they withhold salaries earned by temporary workers until the 
end, so they are terrified that they’ll lose that money by joining the union’.  
Yet, despite its shortcomings, the campaign at Arvind had a number of 
successes including Arvind agreeing to pay overtime and, as Pratibha
29 from 
Garment and Textile Workers’ Union stated, ‘Arvind responded immediately to 
the Karnataka state minimum wage increase in 2014, unlike all other major 
companies, and we believe that is because of the campaign in Ramnagara’. 
Another victory is that the union gained in its direct power vis-a`-vis 
management. Jayram
30 stated,  
The campaign against the union exposed the management’s tactics 
to everyone. They assaulted us, bribed the police, and dismissed 
us, which only emboldened workers’ resolve. We’re stronger 
because of Arvind’s campaign against us.  
Aggregated spaces of value-capture and value-creation  
Arvind’s growth can be attributed to number of factors. It expanded from a cotton 
mill to become one of the largest retailers in India. Yet, many of Bangalore’s 
large apparel production companies have yet to witness the kind of vertical 
integration found in Arvind, such as Bombay Reyon which failed to upgrade and 
has now nearly shuttered their doors completely a victim of Gereffi’s ‘buyer-
driven’ dilemma.  
A few factors can explain this. Denim production is highly specialized and more 
capital-intensive, while the basic material, namely cotton, remains unchanged. 
Thus, there is a greater capacity for technological and economic upgrading. 
Further, there is an enhanced ability to overpower potential competitors, and, 
over time, to achieve a vertical expansion across the value chain. Arvind’s initial 
success was due to its strategic investment decisions such as indigenous denim 
production and its expanding outside of urban spaces with its RufNTuf brand that 
combated rural skepticism of readymade clothing by creating low-cost bare 
bones precut ‘ready-to-stitch’ jeans, while effectively transferring part of the 
labour process to the consumer. This functioned as an ‘extra-market’ mechanism 
to lower labour costs by relying on the unwaged work undertaken predominantly 
by women in the home.  
Arvind’s growth expanded quickly following the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. 
Similar to Tokatli and K1z1lgu ̈ n’s (2004) case study of the growth of a denim 
manufacturer in Turkey after European quotas were relaxed in the mid-1990s, 
the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement directly contributed to the growth of Arvind. 
In the case of Turkey, Tokatli claims that preferential treatment to European and 
U.S. markets explained internal upgrading but not the expansion to higher-value 
phases in the value chain. However, what we see from the case of Arvind is that 
these two processes are complimentary. Through internal upgrading Arvind 
increased sectoral barriers to entry. As a large capital-holding firm, Arvind further 
‘locks-in’ its market share, expand into more value-added activities of product 
development, branding, marketing, and retail, absorbing them into the full pack- 
age network.  
Through vertical integration and technological upgrading, firms like Arvind 
increase their proportion of profits by reducing the cost of production and 
increasing capacity. The capacity of these firms to move upstream in more value-
added links in the global clothing commodity chain cemented their market power. 
Gereffi (2002) states that much of the power of global ‘buyers’ is in their ability to 
‘act as strategic brokers in linking overseas factories and traders’; yet what we 
see from companies like Arvind is the fusing of consumption, via marketing and 
branding, and production, via production and logistics, under one roof, 
weakening the strategic power of these traditional ‘brokers’.  
While acknowledging that a distribution site is different from a production site, the 
struggle at the Arvind’s Ramnagara warehouse allows us to examine the first 
stages of this shifting dynamic between producers and buyers, workers and their 
employers. One of the clearest examples of this change is the signing of long-
term exclusive licensing contracts between major brands and Arvind, which apply 
across South Asia and the Middle East. A number of PVH-owned clothing brands 
that were distributed through the Ramnagara site had signed long-term contracts 
shortly before or during the labour unrest at the Ramnagara. Such long-term 
agreements had been pushed by Arvind and portend a departure from short-term 
purchasing orders, which are still a hallmark of assembly-only suppliers. The 
weakness of assembly-only suppliers is their dependence on buyers, but long-
term contracts have the effect of ‘locking-in’ retailers and brands to large firms 
like Arvind and, in part, melding together disintegrated chains.  
Arvind’s expansion from textiles meant that it began at a higher valued phase 
than assembly-only production. It is not cost-effective to ship natural fibres in raw 
form, which gives textile industries in supplier countries a built-in advantage. The 
specifications of international buyers for these specialized products advantaged 
large-scale indigenous producers by intensifying supplier-end technological 
upgrading, organizational agglomeration, and supply chain integration. The 
strategy at Arvind is to focus on delivery to five or six large-scale customers in 
order to align delivery capacity to their sourcing calendar and ease uncertainty of 
demand. By providing end-to-end ‘full package’ services for a few large-scale 
brands, Arvind became an irreplaceable partner to key players in the 
international clothing market. The resulting production networks are a durable 
system of social capital that is a precious competitive asset for global buyers.  
As shown throughout, economies of scale brought on by upgrading and social 
downgrading undercuts competitors, allowing the firm to expand into the various 
phases in the production process, leading to the emergence of full packages, 
which bring down the costs of production for buyers. This results in higher 
volume orders for Arvind and, a greater competitive disadvantage for 
competitors, more downsizing and closures for competitors, and an accelerated 
rate of expansion horizontally for Arvind. The final outcome is a combined force 
of greater value capture at the supplier end of the commodity chain and fewer 
competitive options for buyers. In essence, Gap needs Arvind almost as much as 
Arvind needs Gap, a reality that will be further cemented if current trends 
continue.  
Part of the ‘full package’ includes Arvind’s retail chains that run across the 
country selling international brands as well as its own. Arvind and other such 
firms operate as gatekeepers to these emerging consumer markets, 
guaranteeing an immense shift in power vis-a-vis buyers. An example is the case 
of U.S. retailer Gap. Gap actively sought out the Indian market after heavy losses 
in the U.S. Expansion into the subcontinent became essential for Gap as a 
strategy to absorb and turn the tide on its own crisis of profitability. Despite the 
Indian government allowing a 100% foreign direct investment since 2012, Gap 
chose to join with their long-time manufacturing partner Arvind to become a vital 
partner in its entry into India’s burgeoning consumer market, both online and 
offline. But retail reaches beyond India for Arvind with licensing and 
manufacturing for PVH across Asia and the Middle East, as well as being an 
official retailer of PVH in India. Thus, you can classify some large capital holding 
garment suppliers in India, who were once comprador in nature, as now in the 
league of global multinational capital.  
Most evidently the shifting dynamic between buyer and producer is found by 
those involved in the struggle in Ramnagara itself. It became clear early on to 
those involved that the Arvind case revealed prescient clues to other cases that 
would open shortly after. Pratibha,31 organizer at Garment and Textile Workers’ 
Union, states while reflecting on the campaign,  
We did everything right. We put pressure on the brands, like PVH, 
we got an auditor in, we had a sympathetic brand representative, 
but the company was still able to reorganize the task of the 
warehouse to diminish our power without diminishing their standing 
with brands.  
Specialization is not the only variable in buyer–producer symbiosis but 
represents a key path towards monopoly power. For example, Shahi Exports is 
one of the largest export-oriented garment manufacturers in India; however, they 
are not specialized. Shahi produces a large proportion of clothes for H&M, Gap, 
and other major brands in its 56 factories in India alone, yet have repeatedly 
violated basic labour rights in the face of frequent warnings from international 
monitoring organizations. As one auditor
32 at a prominent monitoring organization 
told me,  
Shahi knows we have been monitoring them since 2002, but they 
continue to openly violate basic workers’ rights. H&M has been made 
known of Shahi’s violations and have gone completely silent. It’s 
because H&M knows that it will be too expensive to find another 
producer the size of Shahi. Shahi knows this and that’s why they 
don’t care.  
A new space for workers’ power?  
Many workers at Arvind maintain that the management was desperate to close 
the warehouse due to the union, but a combination of factors prevented them 
from doing so. This included: the long-term lease, the trade union campaign, 
potential legal violations, a possible international backlash led by United Students 
Against Sweatshops and the International Union League for Brand 
Responsibility, and, most importantly, the ability for Arvind to internally 
reorganize and transform a inward-outward pressing warehouse for international 
buyers into a returns warehouse where goods are delivered to domestic in-house 
retailers. Thus, reducing the structural power of workers located at a strategic 
‘chokepoint’ in the supply chain, averting economic liability of worker unrest is 
considerably reduced.
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Unlike domestic capital of South Asia of the past Arvind is flexible, restructuring 
domestic and international functions to reduce risk. This dual labour markets 
strategy applies at multiple levels. Firstly, Arvind provides its ‘core’ employees, 
such as managers, designers or others at high-value phases, with a wide breadth 
of employee benefits whereas ‘peripheral’ workers, those employed through shell 
contractor companies at the low-value phases of production, remain 
subcontracted, heavily exploited, with few avenues for redress. Secondly, 
Arvind’s phases of production for international brands are in-house while its 
production for domestic retail and of its own brands are outsourced. This 
suggests that Arvind could become the ‘driver’ of its own buyer-driven chain 
involving regional suppliers (in places such as Bangladesh). They may deploy a 
similar strategy of transnational brands delinking production to reduce risk 
brought on by the instability of seasonality and fluctuating consumption patterns. 
Finally, as was accomplished during the struggle at the Arvind in-house 
warehouse in Ramnagara, a pressing warehouse was converted into a returns 
warehouse externalizing its labour from ‘core’ to ‘non-core’ functions. This 
insulates Arvind from potential pressure by major brands that might otherwise be 
compelled to place pressure on Arvind over labour violations, averting potential 
losses caused by work stoppages or strikes at a major artery in its distribution 
network. Thus, the flexibility of dual labour markets allow Arvind multiple methods 
by which to intensify downward pressure on subcontracted workers, reduce 
liability by cleaving production from consumption, while minimizing the efficacy of 
workplace actions.  
What the case of growing supplier-end firms like Arvind shows is that large 
capital holding companies are able to expend more capital to bring on expensive 
temporary workers and have a growing number of alternative facilities to 
undermine workers’ actions at a single warehouse. Arvind was able to invest in a 
number of substitute warehouses across the state and replace the work at 
Ramnagara. This capacity would be inconceivable a few decades ago or with 
smaller capital holding firms. The workers’ struggle at the Arvind warehouse 
represents a classic example in which greater market power and value capture 
for Arvind translates into a greater ability for capital to overwhelm and undermine 
labour at a specific facility. By maintaining a spatially aggregated production 
network, with numerous facilities distributed in same area, Arvind can seamlessly 
turn the production process around from one facility to another, whether it is a 
full-grown production plant or a warehouse.  
Despite reorganization and losing members, the trade union at the Ramnagara 
warehouse remained intact. However, the result is contradictory. A budding ‘full 
package’ environment can result in greater bargaining power from the point of 
production. As Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen (2018: 87) have pointed out  
if suppliers earn lower unit rates over time, workers also tend to 
receive lower wages. If suppliers must reduce lead times, workers 
will have to engage in overtime work. Thus, the optimum point for 
suppliers and workers is inherently linked.  
As workers at Arvind indicated, company profits and high-profile deals can be 
used to bolster demands for a greater share of the value for workers. Information 
that was previously hidden became accessible to workers because of Arvind 
growing and high-profile status. Arvind’s sizeable value capture augmented 
workers’ demands and strengthened the union sharpening the antagonism 
between workers and their direct employer.
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Alongside Arvind’s growth across the supply chain, workers create their own 
mirrored ‘labour networks’ of Arvind and affiliated workers. For example, workers 
received information on Arvind’s plans from a worker who had retained a contact 
at his old job within the Arvind logistics network. This information was critical in 
preventing the relocation. Moreover, Arvind workers attempted to expand the 
membership of the union to include nearby Arvind textile and garment facilities to 
unify demands against a single employer whereas previously smaller firms 
littered the landscape creating impermeable barriers to unity.  
Finally, the campaigns on US campuses as well as the targeting of retail shops 
assisted an expansion in the labour network to include allied activists, urban 
unions, and Arvind retail workers. The Arvind campaigns highlight a growth in the 
purchasing power in the Global South, the resulting boom in retail, and a shift in 
the power of workers to confront their employer at the point of sale. By targeting 
retail shops in Mysore and Bangalore both at Arvind-owned shops and their 
major brand buyers during the campaign, workers were able to attack both point 
of production and point of consumption to put pressure on their direct employers. 
Thus, the bridging of spaces of production and consumption while benefiting 
suppliers is also changing the relationship between global buyers and, now, 
global producers through a burgeoning retail market. But clearly this is also 
helping alter the relationship between workers and their bosses by adding 
multiple points of leverage. The growth of consumer power in the Global South is 
a relatively new phenomenon and is potentially another tool for workers within a 
new generation of ‘anti-sweatshop’ campaigns.  
Arvind’s growing client list also means a greater ability to survive the loss of a 
single contract even from a large branded company. The relationship between 
buyer and supplier continues to be asymmetrical in favour of buyers, but 
companies like Arvind are no longer entirely dependent on a single global brand. 
Arvind can increasingly withstand the loss of a single major client. Whereas with 
smaller assembly-only, single-factory suppliers, a single brand can become the 
ultimate decision-maker, and the breaking of a large purchasing contract has 
often resulted in the closure of the factory. Moreover, large firms like Arvind hold 
enough capital of their own to withstand the loss of a single contract. It is true 
that emergent firms like Arvind have not generated surpluses in the form of 
finance capital, rather capital that is accumulated is immediately invested. Yet, 
the liquidity and leveraging of assets affords large suppliers a degree of freedom 
not accessible to assembly-only suppliers.  
These changing dynamics have informed Garment and Textile Workers’ Unions 
strategies. From its foundation in 2005, Garment and Textile Workers’ Unions 
strategy has gone from a reactive ‘hot shop’ form, followed by community 
organizing strategy; and in 2012, it began to target brands’ outsourced 
production by affiliating with the International Union League for Brand 
Responsibility. Following the struggle at Arvind, Garment and Textile Workers’ 
Union added another layer to its strategy to account for the changing nature of 
supplier-end capital. The symbiosis of buyer and supplier meant that workers 
could now leverage a greater degree of power against full package suppliers 
across the supply chain buttressed by a corporate campaign for traditional 
western brands. As a staff organizer
35 from Garment and Textile Workers’ Union 
stated,  
Three years ago our strategy was organizing the community 
through our women’s organization and convert community 
members into factory-level committees, from there we propped our 
union up. After that we moved towards targeting a single brand, 
organizing the outsourced company, and getting our allies in the 
west to put consumer pressure through brand campaigns....as we 
see in Ramnagara, the land itself is the value because they don’t 
have valuable machinery there, making labor organizing at a single 
facility a recipe for failure.... Its not like ten years ago, now even if 
we get a brand to tell a manufacturer to remediate a situation the 
manufacturer will refuse. I was in a meeting where it happened just 
like that. Now, we’re starting to look at a strategy of organizing 
companies like Shahi or Arvind. With such large companies present 
in the sector you can no longer organize around a single factory or 
rely only on Western allies and expect it would sustain itself.  
Conclusion  
Arvind is not an isolated case. The strategy of consumer-oriented campaigns 
reflected the once unilateral power of global brands situated almost exclusively in 
the Global North. This global distanciation between spaces of value creation and 
capture compelled activists to place pressure on garment transnational 
corporations through consumer activism, codes of conduct, and auditing regimes. 
Despite efforts to put pressure ‘from above’ and a few isolated victories, the 
forces of profit and competition in this buyer-driven sector were far greater than 
the risk posed from bad public relations. Indeed, as Jeff Hermanson,
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Global Strategies at Workers’ United-SEIU, observed ‘there’s a connection 
between the investment one makes with CSR and the image that one has – 
there’s a direct connection – it’s a more important connection than how they 
actually produce a shirt’.  
However, the power dynamic in the global garment industry is shifting to a more 
mutually dependent symbiotic relationship between global brands and big 
multinational production companies, with the original Taiwanese, Korean, Hong 
Kong and Singaporean companies now being joined by Indian, Sri Lankan, 
Bangladeshi and Mainland Chinese companies. There are of course significant 
differences between how these different fractures of capital function. The case of 
Arvind demonstrates how one type of big production company developed into a 
power unto itself, is able to deal with the brands as not quite an equal but 
symbiotic, as ‘strategic partners’. Ongoing struggles at companies such as the 
Azim Group in Bangladesh, where the owner is a politically connected and a 
powerful member of the national elite, is able to use violence with impunity 
against trade unionists, and stand up to transnational brands despite a number of 
brands cutting their relationship with the company, indicates a growing power of 
garment firms across the subcontinent.  
Of the 400 denim manufacturers worldwide, around 40 manufacturers account 
for less than 30% of the world output, whereas the largest retailers share more 
than 30% of the markets amongst themselves (Sampler and Sarkar, 2010). This 
incongruity shows that ‘buyers’ are still more powerful within the denim 
commodity chain; however, output is not the only variable involved. Arvind’s 
market power is linked not to its production capacity alone, but rather to its 
integrated value chain and access to the Indian consumer market, which 
provides substantial economies of scale, cost cutting as well as shorter cycle and 
turnaround times for buyers.  
As global brands continue to outsource more of the production process, 
companies like Arvind continue to insource and expand into the export-oriented 
value chain. Arvind’s one-stop shop offers global buyers cost-effective 
procurement of raw materials, shorter lead, inventory and transport times, and 
other cost benefits tied to an integrated supply chain. Despite buyers outsourcing 
to reduce their international production footprint, the signing of long-term full 
package agreements has the effect of locking-in brand name companies with 
higher-value suppliers and reconfiguring the buyer–producer relationship. This 
results in further upgrading potential, falling Degree of Monopsony Power, and 
the erecting of greater barriers to entry ensuring, in the long term, that a handful 
of specialized supplier firms ascend as capitals with high degrees of monopolistic 
power, who may eventually allow full package firms to determine investment, 
price, output and employment while being increasingly vital gatekeepers to 
Global South consumers.  
As we see from the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, due to the low 
value, highly monopsonistic supply chains, workers in the garment sector relied 
on placing pressure at both the retail/brand ends and from the shopfloor. When 
the points of production and consumption were both in the same region – 
workers themselves could picket both sites. However, under early globalization 
the realities of rising Degree of Monopsony Power resulted in falling bargaining 
power for suppliers and workers. The now global distanciation forced workers to 
rely on Global North allies, which relied even further on top down over bottom up 
strategies. However, the changes in the garment GVC are placing spatial limits 
on global brands/retailers, blurring this top down/bottom up dichotomy as it had 
done with the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union. Simply put, the 
Degree of Monopsony Power in the global garment sector was simply too high to 
render effective any of the Codes/ Audit regimes. As we see from the case of 
Arvind, the changing composition of the garment GVC, falling Degree of 
Monopsony Power, and the growing oligopoly power of suppliers, has meant that 
newly agitating trade unions and workplace actions are now made more effective 
through established codes of conduct and audits.  
In sum, there is no pristine divide between buyer and supplier driven GVCs in all 
cases, and more symbiotic relationships between buyers and suppliers can 
emerge; and such emergence can provide new grounds for labour activism, 
though results maybe quite mixed for workers. The changing relationship from 
asymmetrical buyer-driven value chain to a mutually dependent buyer–producer 
symbiosis illustrated throughout this case study is best demonstrated by an 
anecdote from an auditor of an independent labour organization who had 
inspected the Ramnagara firings in 2012,
37 ‘It’s clear that a “brand pressure” 
campaign simply wouldn’t work here’, adding, ‘with companies like Arvind, from 
our experience, brands just don’t have as much leverage anymore because 
Arvind now effectively controls all of PVH’s production and sales in the entire 
region’. During the Arvind investigation, it became clear that PVH was not in an 
optimum position to negotiate with Arvind, and as the independent monitor later 
indicated, ‘PVH cannot lose Arvind’s business, since the kind of services that 
Arvind offers are only replaceable at a heavy financial cost to PVH [. . .] PVH 
needs Arvind and Arvind needs PVH’.  
Large buyers are increasingly agreeing to longer-term, larger-volume 
relationships with a progressively smaller number of full-package producers, 
resulting in fewer alternative options for buyers – increasing the degree of spatial 
inflexibility. This changing power relations within the value chain is reflected in 
workers’ bargaining power and strategies. The decline of assembly-only oriented 
garment capitals is part of a process, as Karl Marx (1867: 435) wrote, ‘the larger 
capitals beat the smaller. . .It always ends in the ruin of many smaller capitalists, 
whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their conquerors, partly vanish’. Out 
of the concentration of the ‘conquering’ few, full package firms may emerge as 
firms with a high degree of monopoly power in the sector.  
Ultimately, the case reveals two distinct phenomena in the garment GVC and 
industrial relations. First, an increase in the scale and market diversification of 
specialized Southern suppliers (i.e. the emergence of the mega supplier) shifts 
the power balance between them and the Northern buyers, weakening the 
bargaining power of Northern buyers (‘brands’). As we see from the case, these 
changes bring both obstacles and opportunities for workers. The various codes 
and conduct or auditing regimes were essential to assist the workers’ campaign – 
but that is the limit of their utility. However, the implications of this dynamic on 
workers’ rights depend, in part, on where the Northern buyer stood on the issue 
of labour rights. On the one hand, buyers’ relentlessly search for firms with labour 
costs that are low and undergird the global race to the bottom. On the other 
hand, Northern brands are highly scrutinized by NGOs, consumer groups, and 
anti-sweatshop activists in their own countries, and as a consequence can be 
relatively better (compared to Southern suppliers) at labour protection. 
Diminishing Northern buyers’ bargaining power could negatively impact for 
workers’ rights at least in the short term.38 Thus, on the one hand, the strategy 
deployed for two decades that relies on the dual pressure on Northern NGOs and 
anti-sweatshop activists becomes less effective. But on the other, the mega-
supplier itself can now be more actively scrutinized through a ‘direct’ spotlight 
from the inside – from the shop floor – with workers shifting strategy by more 
directly targeting their employers and bringing local and international media and 
allies for secondary pressure.  
Second, the case of Arvind epitomizes the increase in the ‘value-added’ in the 
Global South, which results from the emergence of full package firms active in 
R&D, design and marketing. This is attributable to, in large part, the development 
of the Indian economy and the growth of its domestic market. Importantly, the 
growth of full package firms facilitates the process of labour market dualization in 
the Southern part of the GVC. As the case clearly indicates the dynamic of core 
and peripheral workers within the firm begins to develop within the South as well. 
Though beyond the scope of this paper, this remains an important area of 
inquiry.  
Beginning with the post-colonial Nehruvian state, into the post-reform period, 
India’s garment sector consisted primarily of a domestic comprador capital. 
India’s garment firms acted as go-betweens for transnational capital, who were 
required to ‘partner’ with an indigenous firm to operating in the country, a rapidly 
changing dynamic in recent years. Ramnagara represents a case-in-point; these 
changes in the sector are both obstacles and opportunities for workers. If these 
trends continue, garment workers, sector trade unions, and anti-sweatshop allies 
will need to reassess strategies and redirect their energies, to target large ‘full 
package’ firms across the supply chain and demand a greater share of 
production as Garment and Textile Workers’ Union has done.  
Notes  
1. The author wishes to thank Craig Jeffrey, Linda McDowell, Danny Dorling, 
Kevin Ward, Adrian Smith, Elena Baglioni, Jack Mahoney, Jeff 
Hermanson, Joel Feingold, Alex Gawenda, Giorgos Galanis, Katy Fox-
Hodess, and the Queen Mary University Centre for Labor and Global 
Production, as well as the three anonymous reviewers from Competition 
and Change for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. This paper was written in part with the generous support from the 
Leverhulme Trust.    
2. Fold’s (2002) ‘bi-polar’ supply chains are fundamentally asymmetrical since 
large cocoa buyers ‘control’ competition through source distribution while 
specialization within clothing production results in increased 
interdependent ‘symbiosis’ between buyers and producers.    
3. ‘Value’ is a contested concept (see Starosta 2010).    
4. For a Marxist critiques of international law, imperialism and race see Knox 
(2016)    
5. Gereffi’s (2002) theory is based on the assumption that ‘lead firms’ in producer-
driven chains typically belong to international oligopolies (e.g. Ford, 
Boeing, Caterpiller, Mitsubishi, etc.). Buyer-driven commodity chains (that 
supply brands like Nike or retailers like Gap), by contrast, are 
characterized by highly competitive, ‘globally decentralized factory 
systems with low barriers to entry in production’.    
6. Buyer-supplier symbiosis resembles the mutually dependent ‘relational’ GVC 
described in Gereffi et al. (2005).    
7. Although beyond the scope of this paper there is now new research on the 
global dimensions of employment relations (see Bair and Ramsay, 2003; 
Knorringa and Pegler, 2006; Lakhani et al., 2013; Riisgaard and Hammer, 
2011) Much of this literature has emphasized how distinct global 
governance regimes are reflected in distinct employment relations 
frameworks.    
8. Arvind incorporated a dual distribution system creating its own separate 
distribution channels of what became known as Arvind’s Original Denim, a 
brand in itself. This eliminated middlemen between manufacturer and 
producer, representing Arvind’s first step beyond textile mills.    
9. The state’s relation to petty commodity producers has been increasingly 
ambivalent and contradictory, authorizing policies that destroy them such 
as evictions and the displacement that results from the promotion of 
capital-biased technology, and promote them such as welfare, self-help 
groups, micro-finance, etc. (Harriss-White, 2009).    
10. In 2015, the Aditya Birla Group vertically consolidated its many brands 
under one roof to create India’s largest apparel company (Tiwari, 2015).    
11. Brands include: Flying Machine (jeans), RufNTuf (jeans), Newport (jeans), 
and Excalibur (shirts).    
12. A contract company run by Arvind HR Manager Harsha technically 
employed the 150 warehouse workers. Despite the India Contract Labor 
Act of 1970 that prohibits contract employees from being tasked with ‘core’ 
activities, the practice of shell contract companies is endemic. The 
workers were predominantly from Ramnagara, around 50 were women, 
and a majority were low caste dalits or categorized as Other Backward 
Classes.    
13. Interview, 11 October 2014.    
14. I did not have the language skills to interview interstate workers.    
15. Interview, 5 February 2013.    
16. Interview, 12 October 2014.    
17. Interview, 14 December 2013.    
18. Interview, 6 February 2013.    
19. Interview, 6 February 2013.    
20. Interview, 11 October 2014.    
21. Interview, 14 December 2013.    
22. A worker, Jayram (Interview, 11 October 2014), described the return 
warehouse tasks: ‘If someone   outside India returns a shirt produced by 
Arvind that now comes to our warehouse and we wash, iron, and 
repackage it. It’s then delivered to Arvind’s own discount retailer, such as 
MegaMart, and is sold usually at a 50% discount or “buy 1 get 1 for free” 
deal. Older clothes that don’t sell are also repackaged at the returns 
warehouse’.    
23. Interview, 29 September 2014.    
24. Interview, 13 November 2014.    
25. Interview, 15 October 2014.    
26. Interview, 11 October 2014.    
27. Interview, 4 December 2014.    
28. Interview, 6 February 2013.    
29. Interview, 15 October 2014.    
30. Interview, 11 October 2014.    
31. Interview, 2 November 2014.    
32. Interview, 21 November 2014.    
 
33. It has been argued that the battle against capital has now shifted away 
from struggles at the point of production to sabotage of the ‘technical 
infrastructure of the metropolis’, in other words, to circulation, distribution, 
transport and consumption (The Invisible Committee, 2009). But as we will 
see in the case of Arvind warehouse, although it represents an interface 
between production and consumption, unlike the immovable power of a 
port, a critical ‘chokepoint’ in the supply chain, a large shed in a dusty little 
town can be easily replaced or reorganized to render powerless in the 
chain.    
34. For more on labour’s structural power and powerlessness at key points 
along commodity chains, see Wright (2000), Anderson (2009, 2013), and 
Cumbers (2015).    
35. Interview, 20 October 2014.    
36. Interview, 26 September 2016.    
37. Interview, 19 October 2014.    
38. See Mosley and Uno (2007), Greenhill et al. (2009), and most recently 
Adolph et al. (2017) on   Shanghai effect.  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